


RUTGERS

School of Arts and Sciences

2023



**Opposing Globalization from the Left
and from the Right**

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1 Introduction: From Seattle to the borders of Europe

In the late 1990s and early 2000s a series of high-profile protests against the corporate world, free trade, and international financial institutions dominated the international headlines. The 1999 Seattle anti-World Trade Organization (WTO) protest, also known as the “Battle of Seattle”, is one of the earliest and the most prominent of these events. Seattle was selected to host the WTO Ministerial conference and according to the City of Seattle (2023): “the conference began in November 1999 and inspired one of the largest political protests ever in Seattle. Protesters focused on issues including workers’ rights, sustainable economies, and environmental and social issues. ...When downtown streets and intersections could not be cleared and after downtown businesses were vandalized, the Major of Seattle declared a civil emergency.” The Seattle protest mobilized over 50,000 individuals and it was the beginning of a new protest wave that opposed globalization and called for global justice (Wood 2014, p. 26). These protests would accompany most high-profile international meetings in the upcoming years.

Around 15 years later a new and quite different wave of anti-globalization protests made the international headlines. With slogans such as “Wir sind das Volk” (we are the people), marches organized by the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) started in Germany in 2015. Those marches would attract thousands of supporters demanding tighter immigration control in Germany and Europe (Connolly 2015). The movement was seen by experts as a reaction to globalization. PEGIDA was not just driven by the fear of refugees but also by a growing feeling of discontent among a part of the German population (Blome 2015). Protesters were looking for “Heimat”, a sense of home and belonging, and strongly opposed the constant political pressure to adapt to globalization (Blome 2015). At about the same time, similar movements emerged across the European continent. For instance, Rosary to the Borders in Poland demanded the protection of the Polish and European homeland (Kotwas/Kubik 2019, p. 435).

Those two protest waves seem to have little in common at first sight. However, they are opposing the same phenomenon, globalization. According to Freinstein (2020): “one of the largest issues that apparently unites different groups within the public is the opposition to what has been called ‘globalization’, across various processes in outcomes”. Indeed, anti-globalization movements on the left and right side of the spectrum demand different outcomes and emphasize different issues while, on the surface, opposing the same phenomenon. Thus, this paper aims to answer the research question: Based on the social movement literature, what is the difference

between left- and right-wing anti-globalization movements? The answer to this question has important implications for future research and gives insights into the causal mechanisms driving the phenomenon of anti-globalization movements.

2 The anti-globalization movements

The anti-globalization movement is a social movement and thus at its core, definitions of social movements apply to the phenomenon. Tarrow (2011, p. 9) defines social movements as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities”. These features, collective challenges, common purposes, social solidarity, and sustained interaction amongst groups, are central to anti-globalization movements. However, for anti-globalization movements specifically, certain properties have to be added to the definition. According to the European Centre for Populism Studies (2023), “the anti-globalization movement is a social movement critical of economic globalization”. In particular, the movements oppose large, multinational corporations having unregulated political power, exercised through trade agreements and deregulated financial markets (Ibid.). Corporations are accused of seeking to maximize profit at the expense of standards and workers, and the movements aim to challenge the Washington Consensus of free-market capitalism. (Ibid.). Indeed, the early left-wing movement laid a central focus on opposing pro-capitalist policies of institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, the protesters claimed that the G 8, consisting of leading economies, forced poorer countries to privatize essential services like water or telecommunication (King/Lawley 2019, p. 588). Left-wing protesters rejected the liberalization of the economies of poor countries and argued that globalization serves only the interest of a global elite (Ibid.). The anti-globalization label became widespread with the Seattle protest but activists claimed that label since the beginning of the movement (Eschle 2004, p.71). However, this aspect of the definition of anti-globalization movements is not applicable to activism from the right side of the spectrum because these movements focus less on economic issues. Right-wing anti-globalization movements differentiate themselves significantly from their left counterpart. So much so that certain anti-globalization movement definitions do not fit both phenomena. Thus, the definition of an anti-globalization movement is broadened in this paper to – a social movement that opposes global integration on the economic, political, or social dimension.

Common arguments of anti-globalization movements are that porous borders, free trade, and thinly stretched supply chains make the world more fragile and states more vulnerable to disruption and shocks (Alden 2022). Moreover, violence is one prominent characteristic of anti-globalization movements. Protests such as those opposing the G8 or the World Bank at the advent of the millennium often turned violent (King/Lawley 2019, p. 588). In contrast, peaceful protests that received less media attention are not uncommon either. For instance, in 2005 over 200,000 protesters campaigned for trade justice, fairer trading rules, and for the cancellation of unaffordable international debts for developing countries (King/Lawley 2019, p. 588). The movements described in this section emerged mainly from the left side of the spectrum. However, the rise of populism is widely seen as a backlash against globalization, and institutionally known right-wing actors such as Marie Le Pen and Donald Trump were handed mandates to take control back from globalization (European Centre for Populism Studies 2023). Such attitudes also manifested outside of institutions. For decades, anti-globalization sentiments were largely ignored because of the benefits of global integration (Alden 2022). However, recent disruptions such as COVID-19, the 2015 Refugee Crisis in Europe, and the war in Ukraine brought attention back to the downsides of globalization. An increase in protectionism in turn contributed to rising inflation and it became apparent that benefits of globalization also bring risks of geopolitical tensions.

3 Social movement theories

Anti-globalization movements are social movements. Thus, it is crucial to place the phenomenon in the social movement literature. The emergence of all social movements are similar, and identical causal mechanisms are often at play. That is why the traditional approaches give important insights into the processes of organization, mobilization, and sustenance of anti-globalization movements.

The grievance-based approach

The earliest theories of social movements attempt to explain the phenomenon by highlighting the importance of grievances. Crowd psychology sees the crowd itself as irrational and argues that it takes away the rational mind of the individual (Le Bon 1977). Moreover, Gurr's (1970, p. 25) influential theory of relative deprivation argues that the perceived discrepancy between value expectation and value capabilities sparks mass mobilization. Through comparison,

individuals conclude that they deserve better, and thus social movements emerge. Scholars long debated the importance of grievances and pointed out major flaws of the approach. Importantly, little empirical support was found for grievance-based theories (Skocpol 1994, p. 103).

Resource mobilization approach

Explanations based on resource mobilization emerged to address the shortcomings of the grievance-based approach. The resource mobilization approach became the widespread paradigm in the social movement literature from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Mobilization is seen as a form of incentivized behavior and organization and resources such as money or time are key. Actors rationally calculate the benefits and costs of participating in social movements and make decisions based on this calculation. Central to this type of literature is the collective action dilemma. Social movements need to overcome the free rider problem whereby non-participants gain the benefits but bear none of the costs of supplying the collective good, which in this case is successfully opposing the globalization process. According to Olson (1971), small groups can have an advantage in overcoming the free rider problem because sufficiently small groups can provide themselves with some amount of collective good through the voluntary and rational participation of one or more members (Olson 1971, p. 33). Here, a single individual could benefit even if bearing the cost of the provision. The author distinguishes between exclusive and inclusive goods and groups. Furthermore, McCarthy and Zald (1977, p. 1219) state that resource aggregation requires some minimal form of organization, and they introduce the term social movement industry. Some form of organization is necessary to sustain collective action. According to Chong (1991, p. 2), only private goals have intrinsic value and thus those are the only goals that can contribute to overcoming the free rider problem. Again, he distinguishes between private and public such as civil rights and makes clear that selective incentives need to be introduced to overcome the collective action problem (Ibid., p. 8). The resource mobilization approach is often criticized for overemphasizing individuals' ability and willingness to rationally calculate.

Political opportunity structures

The political opportunity structures approach emerged in the late 1980s and postulates that mobilization is structured by the opening and closing of institutions. Tarrow (1998) is one of the most influential scholars of this literature. According to him, contentious politics emerge in

response to changes in political opportunities and threats, and when building on opportunities and repertoires of collective action even individuals with limited resources can act contentiously (Tarrow 1998, p. 16). Similarly, McAdam *et al.* (2002, p. 51) stress the development of contention through social interaction and place social construction at the center of their analysis. Political actors consist of sets of persons and relations whose internal organization and connections maintain substantial contentious (Ibid., p. 11), and thus the opening of political opportunities is sufficient for collective action to emerge.

Cultural approaches

Cultural approaches emerged in the 1990s. They highlight the importance of cultural framing and emotional processes. One of the most significant contributions comes from Jasper (1998). Strong emotions accompany protest (Ibid., p. 397). However, that does not render protest irrational, as postulated by Le Bon (1977), but collective action is affected by context-specific emotions. The behavioral implications of specific emotions are still unclear. Poletta (2006, p. 32) focuses on framing and finds that the Greensboro sit-ins during the U.S. civil rights movement were framed for the public as spontaneous acts even though they required substantial organization and network ties. Specifically, institutionalized discursive processes and framing were used to generate more participation in the social movement (Ibid., p. 37). Moreover, Scott (1990) focuses on the culture of resistance. According to him, subordinate groups express themselves in the form of hidden transcripts (Ibid., p. 3). Disguise and surveillance combined create a culture of resistance and repeated interaction between dominant and subordinate groups shapes behavior and in the long-term emergence of social movements.

Diffusion

In addition to the classical approaches, there are other theories of social movements that are especially relevant to anti-globalization movements. Diffusion is central to anti-globalization movements and can be seen in the movements' tactics during the left protest wave at the beginning of the millennium as well as now with the spread of right-wing anti-globalization sentiments and movements in Europe. Givan *et al.* (2010, p. 1) describe diffusion as the spread of innovation through direct and indirect channels and state that the process helps to account for the wavelike character of protest cycles. The authors distinguish between two types of diffusion. Content diffusion of behavior is spread through tactics and repertoires while ideational diffusion

is spread through frames (Ibid., p. 4). The latter occurs among actors on different sites but similar structural positions, and links are created through activist networks (Ibid., p. 6). A central mechanism of diffusion is political learning that transfers the construction of meaning (Ibid., p. 8). Furthermore, Weyland (2009) identifies the external pressure of a great power, the promotion of new norms and values, and rational learning from successful contention as mechanisms of diffusion. He argues that rational calculations set outer limits of diffusion and that bounded rationality is the main moving cause (Ibid., p. 392). New information from the outside shapes the rational calculation of individuals.

The Internet and social movements

The Internet emerged as a powerful technology and has major implications for social movements. The literature on the consequences of the Internet for social movements is vast. However, for this essay, it is sufficient to state that the Internet reduces communication costs, leads to long-term attitudinal changes, decreases information uncertainty, and has a mobilizing effect through providing moral shock in the form of dramatic content (Ruijgrok 2016, p. 498).

This brief overview of the literature on social movements demonstrates the variety of the scholarship. Authors focused on different levels of analysis and by highlighting the role of individuals, groups, organizations, and structures, they came to different conclusions about why social movements emerged and how they are sustained. There exists no agreement on which theories are the most accurate and some hold more explanatory power for specific movements than for others. Many factors contribute to mobilization and there does not exist a formula that is generalizable to every social movement.

Literature specific to anti-globalization movements

Nevertheless, the theories presented in this section are important because they provide a comprehensive explanation for the emergence of anti-globalization movements. Grievances, resources, political opportunity structure, and the other factors identified by the social movement literature contribute to the emergence of anti-globalization movements. Participants in the movements are often not satisfied with the mainstream globalization approach. While left-wing activists criticize the unfairness of globalization, supporters of the right-wing anti-globalization movement fear the personal consequences of globalization. Stiglitz (2003, p. 68) states that foreign investment increases the grievances associated with the current heightened version of

globalization. While privatization, liberalization, and macro stability are supposed to create a climate of market attractiveness, they also have major downsides. For instance, local competitors can be impacted by the inflow of investment. This is especially visible in the banking sector where foreign companies often have the size to outperform local ones (Ibid., p. 69). Thus, grievances are key for the emergence of both left-wing and right-wing anti-globalization movements. Furthermore, inequality tends not just to increase the anti-globalization positions of movements but also of individuals. My (2012, p. 408) notes however that institutionalized anti-globalization can be diminished by generous redistribution policies. Income inequality rose in the most advanced industrial democracies in recent years (Ibid., p. 409).

The resource mobilization explanation is also relevant to anti-globalization movements. The resources time, money, and knowledge were central for protests such 1999 anti-WTO protest in Seattle, and openings of political opportunity structures led people to the streets. Moreover, the Internet, even though it was still in its early stages, was central to the 1999 Seattle protest by providing real-time information in the form of blog posts (Juris 2005).

Moreover, frames are central for movements to gain supporters. Fiss and Hirsch (2005) find that the anti-globalization discourse first emerged in response to greater U.S. involvement in the international economy and that later frames contested the meaning of globalization. The framing and its meaning depended on the interests of the actors involved. In addition, Snider et al. (2013) find that framing globalization negatively increased negative emotions towards globalization and outgroups and decreased identification with global citizenship identities.

4 Opposing globalization on the left and on the right

This essay will now focus on the fundamental difference between left- and right-wing movements, which is the difference in the mode of target and the concept of exclusion (Freistein et al. 2020). While the right excludes everything foreign, the left's emphasis on national sovereignty is only symbolically exclusive (Ibid.). On the left, there is an exclusion of certain elites but not the rejection of foreign elements.

4.1 Alter-globalization: Opposing globalization on the left side of the spectrum

As shown with the example of the Seattle protest at the beginning, the left-wing anti-globalization movement began in the mid-1990s. The 1999 protest was only the start of a wave of anti-globalization protests that accompanied the start of the new millennium. Important protest

events were the 1997 Vancouver APEC protest, movements opposing the IMF and the World Bank in Washington DC in 2000 and 2003, protests at the World Economic Forum in New York in 2002, activists opposing the 2008 G8 Summit in Genoa and the G20 Summits in Pittsburgh and Toronto in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Furthermore, the Occupy Wall Street protests in New York and Oakland made headlines in 2011 and one year later protests accompanied the NATO Summit in Chicago. It becomes apparent that for nearly two decades anti-globalization movements targeted high-level summit meetings, especially in North America and Europe. To some extent, this trend holds true to this day. For instance, during the 2017 G20 Summit in Hamburg, rioting anti-capitalist protesters received international media attention (Fox, 2017). To counter those movements, the respective states and police forces used militarized police strategies at times (Wood 2014, p. 25). Pre-emptive arrests of movement leaders, temporary fences, arrests of rallying crowds in anticipation of future activity, and the use of pepper spray were not uncommon occurrences during these protests (Ibid.). An example of extreme police intervention was the pre-emptive arrest of the protest organizer Jaggi Singh and the use of pepper spray to stop protesters during the APEC protest in 1997 (Ibid.). Especially during high-level summits and events, police forces are likely to intervene forcefully because the events need to be undisturbed. Anti-globalization protesters use this fact to their advantage. The refusal to fully cooperate with the police became a well-known practice to attract international attention (Ibid., p. 47). This not only shows that the activists are willing to invest significant resources to get heard but also that governments have no choice but to take left-wing anti-globalization movements seriously.

Resistance and indignation are characteristics of the movement and according to Ruth (2012, p. 323), “U.S.-NATO imperial overstretch has combined with casino capitalism’s catastrophic effects at last coming home to roost in the economic core”. Thus, the movement directly opposed global capitalism. Ruth (2012, p. 324) states that the left-wing movement transformed from anti-globalization over alter-globalization and demanding global peace and justice to a counter-hegemonic project for global democratization. Shared concerns, the targeting of neoliberalism as well as a desire for inter-movement solidarity and broader alliances unite the three phases of the movement (Ibid.). The left-wing anti-globalization movement is extraordinary because of its transnational character that seems to not fit into the idea of opposing globalization at first glance. However, as stated before, this type of movement does not oppose the idea of globalization in general but demands the alteration of current practices to create equality between the Global North and Global South. Eschle (2004, p. 62) states that the movement is not anti-

globalization in a straightforward sense. Rather, it opposes globalized neoliberalism and corporate power. In a sense, it is sounder to characterize the movement as anti-capitalistic or constructing an alternative version of globalization, thus aiming to alter globalization. Activists “have focused more centrally on phenomena associated with economic globalization: the increasing power of corporations, the growing role of international financial institutions, and the neoliberal policies of trade liberalization and privatization propounded by the latter and from which the former benefit” (Ibid., p. 71). It is no coincidence that the left-wing movement is present especially at high-level international summits and meetings of international financial institutions. Activists often use a Marxist critique of capitalism (Ibid., p. 73). They oppose economic inequality, social and environmental destruction, and cultural homogenization, but welcome a general openness to the world. Another interesting point is that some of the protests had surprisingly light involvement from conventional organizations (Bennett 2012, p. 741). For instance, the Los Indignados movement launched mass mobilization in 60 Spanish cities in 2011 with the support solely of civil society and by relying on the use of digital communication. Political parties and unions were not included in the mobilization process on purpose. In addition, the level of education affects the willingness of individuals to join the left-wing anti-globalization movement. Kuah-Pearce (2009, p. 111) argues that “with a higher level of education and an understanding of the socio-economics of the Hong Kong society, together with a higher level of political awareness, an emerging group of students with a social conscience is supportive of protest movements that fight for justice and wealth equality for all”.

To conclude, the left-wing anti-globalization movement is better characterized as an alter-globalization movement because it criticizes the current capitalistic approach to globalization but not the concept of globalization in general. The left has a coherent ideological perception and demands global solidarity and equality but not the complete halt or reversion of the globalization process. The movement is inclusive to potential supporters outside the elite and often utilizes a strategy of high visibility to achieve its goals. While protests that receive an immense amount of international media attention have decreased, they did not vanish. The left-wing alter-globalization movement is still active but now shares its spotlight with a movement from the other side of the spectrum opposing the same phenomenon.

4.2 Globalization of grievances: Opposing globalization on the right side of the spectrum

Two momentous votes in 2016, Brexit in the UK, and the election of Donald Trump and his protectionist ideology in the U.S. started a new era of anti-globalization movements (European Centre for Populism Studies 2023). Wealthy countries situated in the Global North decided to turn their back on the process of globalization that they actively drove forward for decades. In contrast, to the left-wing anti-globalization movement, its counterpart on the right side of the spectrum does not strongly oppose the phenomenon because of its capitalist features. However, the emergence of far-right movements and parties is often read through the lens of economic and cultural grievances that are emerging from globalization (Gattinara/Pirro 2018, p. 453). Accordingly, the right-wing anti-globalization movement often makes use of the political and economic consequences of globalization. For instance, the surge of Chinese imports into advanced industrial countries, the so-called China shock, and heightened immigration are often instrumentalized to increase support for the movement (Mansfield et al. 2021, p. 2274). An upsurge in far-right mobilization was observable after the European refugee crisis (Gattinara/Pirro 2018, p. 451). Gattinara and Pirro (2018, p. 447) state that: “the far right not only includes political parties geared toward elections and public office but also social movements or networks of networks that aim to mobilize public support”. The right-wing anti-globalization movement can be categorized as such a phenomenon on the far right. Mansfield et al. (2021, p. 2275) demonstrates that the right-wing anti-globalization movement is not driven by anti-capitalistic sentiments by stating that: “extreme right-wing parties have been especially fierce proponents of anti-globalization policies, driven by their nationalist and xenophobic manifestos”. Surprisingly however, an empirical study conducted by Milner in a special issue (Mansfield et al. 2021, p. 2275) concluded that heightened trade and technology change stimulated the emergence of right-wing movements while immigration and foreign investment only did so to a lesser extent. Thus, contrary to common perception immigration itself does not seem to be the major driver of right-wing anti-globalization movements.

Furthermore, right-wing anti-globalization sentiments seem to be accompanied by a substantially greater amount of institutionalization than anti-globalization coming from the left. Rising discontent with globalization in the U.S. and Europe occurred alongside support for extreme right-wing parties, protectionism, and anti-immigrant views (Mansfield et al. 2021, p. 2267). Thus, right-wing parties and anti-globalization movements are to some extent tied together. For instance, Donald Trump as the U.S. President represented anti-globalization

sentiments from the right and made them fashionable. Moreover, according to Zaslove (2008, p. 169): “radical right parties campaign against the elite nature of globalization, arguing that financial and political elites, American hegemony, and the growing influence of the European Union destroy the natural fabric of civil society”. The use of anti-globalization tropes became common (Freistein et al. 2020). In addition, the rhetoric of parties and politicians has been infused with growing hostility against globalization in recent years (Ibid., p. 2273). Radical right parties frame the issue of globalization to resonate with a small but significant portion of the electorate that opposes immigration, European integration, and economic globalization (Zaslove 2008, p. 169). A more recent trend is that globalization backlash puts mounting stress on international institutions such as the WTO that helped promote global economic integration (Ibid., p. 2268).

To conclude, the right-wing anti-globalization movement is not driven by anti-capitalist sentiments. However, surprisingly neither is immigration the major driving force. Rather, the movement frames the issue of immigration to amplify grievances that are created by globalization. To demonstrate this, significant proportions of the U.S. and other countries in the Global North have only experienced limited gains in the most recent era of globalization (Horner et al. 2018). The rise of populism and anti-globalization movements is a direct reaction to the failure of traditional parties to respond adequately to recent phenomena including economic and cultural globalization (Albertazzi/McDonnell 2022). Since the beginning of the millennium, globalization itself changed by becoming more chaotic and unequal (Ibid.). In turn, this development led to an increase in grievances that again drive anti-globalization sentiments and movements. Interestingly, Gattinara and Pirro (2018, p. 450) find that far-right actors are more heterogeneous than often assumed. This is evidence that a substantial part of societies in the Global North is affected by such grievances.

4.3 Comparing the movements

What are the major differences and potential similarities between left-wing and right-wing anti-globalization movements? First, the former emphasizes inequalities in the Global South, while the latter emphasizes grievances in the Global North. The left demands the alteration of globalization and opposes the capitalist approach to create a fairer world while the right cleverly frames side-products of globalization, such as immigration, to channel economic grievances in advanced industrial societies. Capitalism as a concept is not criticized by the right. Moreover,

right-wing parties seem to take advantage of these grievances. The institutionalization of the right-wing anti-globalization movement provides evidence. In general, the right-wing movement is more institutionalized. While left-wing action often occurs in the form of grassroots mobilization, the right relies more on the support of parties and institutionalized organizations. Similar to theories of populism, the left-wing movement creates a binary conflict of the people versus the elite (Kubik 2017). In contrast, the right-wing movement creates a triad that plots the people against the local elite and a foreign enemy (Ibid.). The movement opposes the foreign as the enemy and the local establishment as the elite. Members of the elite that deny this elite status, such as Donald Trump, are often at the forefront of these movements. On the other hand, the left-wing anti-globalization movement is truly transnational, including activists from all over the world opposing global capitalism.

On the surface, both movements seem to oppose the same concept. However, this essay illustrates that this is not the case. Rather, both movements oppose fundamentally different concepts, economic systems, and versions of the establishment. Moreover, the organization, targets, and demands of the movements differ significantly.

5 Conclusion

This essay highlighted the emergence and substance of anti-globalization movements. It introduced and defined the term anti-globalization movement and distinguished the left-wing anti-globalization movement from its counterpart on the right side of the political spectrum. It summarized the most important theories on the emergence of social movements and applied the concepts introduced to the case of the anti-globalization movement. Then, it reviewed the relevant literature on both left- and right-wing anti-globalization movements.

In this essay, it becomes apparent that both movements differ fundamentally, and apart from being social movements they have little in common. Both movements oppose different aspects of globalization, and interestingly none of the movements opposes globalization as a general phenomenon. Rather, the left opposes the capitalist characteristics of globalization and its effects in the Global South, while the right capitalizes on the grievances globalization produces in the Global North. To conclude, the right- and the left-wing anti-globalization movements should be seen as separate movements that differ significantly. The distance between the movements on the political spectrum also materializes in the issues the movements oppose and the crowds they attract. Anti-globalization movements differ, like other issues, on the left-right political scale.

Nevertheless, the scholarship on social movements introduced in this essay can be applied to both movements. Key concepts such as grievances, political opportunities, frames, and resource mobilization affect all social movements. Thus, they affect the emergence of both left- and right-wing social movements as well as their chances of success.

Future research should focus on the developments in the separate movements. While the right-wing anti-globalization movement rose in recent years and gained supporters, especially in the Global North, news headlines on left-wing anti-globalization mobilization became less frequent. Events like the Battle of Seattle seem to be phenomena of the past. However, it remains to be seen if the right can keep capitalizing on grievances of globalization and if clever framing from the left side can alter public attention and spark renewed support for the movement. The phenomenon of globalization will likely keep gaining significance and create major changes and challenges for the global population. This trend will continue to produce grievances but also contribute to the opening of political opportunity structures. Thus, social movements are going to mobilize around the issue, and globalization will remain significant for the social movement literature. Research could focus on a comprehensive empirical analysis of the emergence of anti-globalization movements, their demands, participants, targets, and their chances of success to find statistical evidence for the differences between the left- and right-wing anti-globalization movements that this essay highlights.

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