

# THE WARS OF AMERICA

**Professor Jack S. Levy**

Rutgers University

Political Science Seminar  
Spring 2017

PS 395:04

Tuesday, 2:15-5:15pm, Hickman Hall, Rm. 129

Professor Jack S. Levy

jacklevy@rci.rutgers.edu

304 Hickman Hall; 838 932 1073

Office Hours: 1-2pm, after class, and by appointment

<http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/>

Russia's seizure of Crimea, its support of aggression in Ukraine, and its threats against NATO members Estonia, Poland, and Romania have generated some concerns that the United States might be drawn into a war with Russia. The rise of China, in conjunction with the fact that most historical power transitions between the two leading states in the international system have ended up in war, along with increasingly aggressive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea and longstanding conflicts of interest over the status of Taiwan, have led some to worry about the possibility of an escalating Sino-American conflict. Others worry about North Korea, which already has the capability of launching a nuclear strike against U.S. allies in East Asia and which U.S. intelligence estimates will be able to hit U.S. cities on the West Coast within ten years.

A war between nuclear powers is high unlikely, but not impossible. President Kennedy had estimated a one-third chance that the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis might escalate to a US-Soviet war. The potential consequences of such a war make it imperative that we think about the conditions under which it might arise. Could adversaries' misperceptions about American willingness to come to the aid of an ally lead to a fatal miscalculation that triggers the escalation of a conflict spiral? Could there be a gradually escalating action-reaction cycle, accelerated by fears by one or both sides that the failure to take a firm stand might lead to the loss of credibility, the loss of allies, and the loss of domestic support from a nationalistic public that believes that their country has not been given the respect it deserves and that its leaders have been pushed around too often? Could an irrational North Korean leader start a war? Might the US decide to launch a preventive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities? Could an American leader with little foreign policy experience take actions that generate uncertainty about US intentions inadvertently trigger a cycle of misperceptions?

This seminar is designed to help you think about such questions – not by directly examining the world’s potential “hot spots,” but instead by familiarizing you with theories about how wars start and with the historical experience of US interstate wars. Although the contexts of possible future wars will differ from the context of past wars, the knowledge generated in this class will give you the conceptual tools and historical background to make sense of future conflicts and crises. A major international crisis is quite likely to occur in your lifetime.

We have many theories of war. Which best apply to the United States? Are different theories required to explain the different interstate wars of the US? We can only answer these questions through detailed historical analysis. History is important not only because explaining the past is a valuable end in itself, and because history is a fertile source of theoretical ideas, but also because history provides an essential means of testing our theories, adjudicating among competing theories, modifying our theories, and ultimately helping us construct better theories. Equally important, it is by applying abstract theories to concrete historical cases that we can best understand the theories themselves.

To better understand the many different theories of war and peace, it is helpful to categorize them. One of the more useful ways to do that is through the “levels-of-analysis” framework, which differentiates among causes at the levels of the international system, domestic societies, domestic governments, and individual political leaders. We begin the course by explaining the various levels of analysis, illustrating each with both historical cases and current issues. We then use the levels-of-analysis framework to organize an examination of theories of the causes of war and of foreign policy decision-making. We begin with the system level and focus on realist theories of conflict. We give specific attention to the concepts of international anarchy and the security dilemma, and to balance of power theory and power transition theory. We next turn to the “dyadic” level and look at strategic interactions between states, with special attention to deterrence theories, spiral models of escalation, and the “bargaining model of war.” We then look at economic and societal-level theories, including the diversionary theory of war. We then turn to decision-making theories, focusing on both individual-level psychological theories and governmental-level political theories of decision-making. We analyze how factors at each of these levels contribute to escalatory processes, and how they interact with each other to produce complex causal patterns. We illustrate each of the main theoretical arguments with examples from a wide range of historical cases – American and non-American, past and present, Western and non-Western, great power and small power.

The second half of the course will focus on individual student research projects and class presentations. Each student will undertake a major research project on a particular US interstate war. S/he will write a preliminary paper on alternative historical interpretations

of his/her war, present the conclusions to the class, defend their arguments against criticism, and complete a final research paper by the end of the term.

For your research project, you can select from eight different cases of US interstate wars. That should provide you with plenty of choice, so you can find something that will interest you for your research project. With several students working on each case, the oral presentations will be in a panel format. This will facilitate discussion and debate about alternative interpretations of each war. These discussions are important – in some respects more important than the presentations themselves, which is why I keep the presentations fairly short. This format has worked very well in the past.

List of Interstate Wars:

War of 1812

Spanish-American War (1898)

World War I – American Intervention (1917)

Pacific War (U.S.-Japan, 1941)

Korean War (1950-53)

Vietnam War (1965-1973)

1990/91 Persian Gulf War

2003 Iraq War

We can have up to four students, but not more, working on a particular historical case. I will make an exception for the case of American intervention in the First World War, as this is the war's centennial year and should attract considerable attention in the media. We do not have to cover all of these cases, so we can drop ones that do not attract student interest, in which case I might need to rearrange the schedule. I would like to make that decision by the third week of class, if possible. This requires you to do some background reading early in the term for the purposes of selecting a case to study. I keep the reading modest to give you extra time for that purpose. I say more about how to select a case later in the syllabus.

Although the aim of individual research projects is to explain the outcome of a particular historical case, taken together these research projects provide an informal “test” of various theories. If a particular theory appears to “fit” most of our cases, we can gain confidence in its validity. If a theory does not fit many cases, we lose confidence in the theory. Thus we will also emerge from the course better able to generalize about US interstate wars (or possibly conclude that each US war is significantly different). I have set aside the last week of class for a comparative analysis of the causes of America's wars.

## Pedagogical Objectives

The seminar has several pedagogical aims or learning objectives. Students should come out of this course with a general theoretical understanding of the causes of interstate war, some familiarity with the more specific causes of the wars of the United States during the last two centuries, and a much deeper understanding of the causes of a particular war. They will gain experience in thinking in causal terms, in making causal arguments, and in understanding different kinds of causal statements (probabilistic causation and necessary and sufficient conditions, for example). They will also learn to think more about the kinds of historical evidence appropriate for confirming or disconfirming different theoretical or interpretative arguments. All of this is part of critical thinking. A final aim of the course is to help students develop research skills: to plan and organize a research paper, compile and integrate evidence, present and defend an argument before a critical audience, and incorporate criticism into a final research paper.

## READINGS

There are three sets of required reading for the seminar:

- 1) Theoretical reading for part I of the course
- 2) Background reading for each of the historical cases in part II of the course.
- 3) Reading for your specific research project.

**Required Book** (available at Rutgers Barnes & Noble Bookstore, 732 246-8448, 100 Somerset St, New Brunswick), on the internet, and on reserve at Alexander Library):

Jack S. Levy & William R. Thompson, *Causes of War*. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

**Articles and Book Chapters** (available on my Sakai site, [www.sakai.rutgers.edu](http://www.sakai.rutgers.edu))

### Required Theoretical Readings

John J. Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power." In Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., *International Politics*. 7<sup>th</sup> ed. New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005. Pp. 50-60.

Jack S. Levy, "Preventive War: Concept and Propositions." *International Interactions* 37, 1 (March 2011): 87-96.

Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary." In Ralph K. White, *Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War*. New York: New York University Press, 1986. Pp. 107-30.

- Geoffrey Blainey, "The Abacus of Power." In Blainey, *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press, 1988. Pp. 108-124.
- Joe D. Hagan, "Does Decision Making Matter? Systematic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory." *International Studies Review*, 3, 2 (Summer 2001), 5-46.
- Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18, 4 (Spring, 1988): 675-700.
- Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications." *World Politics* 24 (Spring 1972): 40-79.
- Ole R. Holsti, "Crisis Decision-Making." In Philip E. Tetlock, et al., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Chap. 1.

### Required Background Historical Readings for Class Presentations

(Note: Pay attention to page numbers; in some cases it is not necessary to read the entire article).

- Bradford Perkins, "Introduction." In Perkins, ed. *The Causes of the War of 1812: National Honor or National Interest*. Huntington, NY: Krieger, 1976. Pp. 1-7.
- Howard Jones, "U.S. Imperialism and the New Manifest Destiny, 1897-1900." In Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power*. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2002. Pp. 244-70.
- Herbert J. Bass, "Introduction." In Bass, ed., *American Entry Into World War I: Submarines, Sentiment, or Security?* New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964. Pp. 1-7.
- Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, 4 (Spring 1988): 893-922.
- John Stoessinger, "The Temptations of Victory: Korea." In Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*. 9<sup>th</sup> ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2005. Pp. 56-85.
- James Thomson, "How Could Vietnam Happen? An Autopsy." In Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy*. Boston: Little, Brown. Pp. 98-110.
- Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War." *International Security* 16, 2 (Fall 1991): 5-41.
- Charles A. Duelfer and Stephen Benedict Dyson, "Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.-Iraqi Experience." *International Security*, 36, 1 (Summer 2011), 73-100.

All theoretical readings except the book are available in folder #1 on my Sakai site. (Go to <https://sakai.rutgers.edu>, log in, go to Wars of America at the top, then to Resources in the left column). The required historical readings are available in section 2 of my Sakai site. In sections 9-13 I include a bibliography and some additional readings that might be

useful for your individual research projects (more for some wars than for other wars). It is important to note that the handful of pdf's for each war are not sufficient background reading for your research projects. You must go beyond those and look at additional items in the bibliography (but not necessarily all of them).

The theoretical reading, which includes a book and several articles, is designed to provide a brief survey of the leading theories of the causes of war. That is important as an end in itself. It is also essential for your two papers for the class. An understanding of the leading theories will help you identify and summarize the alternative interpretations of the historical case you are studying, which is the focus of your first paper for the course. A theoretical understanding also helps you to organize your research paper on the causes of your war and to interpret the massive amount of historical information on your case. If you are familiar with theories of balance of power, conflict spirals, diversionary behavior, and decision-making, you will be quicker to identify those patterns from your historical readings and to interpret the connections among historical events.

The background historical reading, which consists of one article-length piece per war, provides a historical description of the causes of each of the cases that we will study in this seminar. This serves several purposes. First, if you are not sure which case you want to choose as your research project, a quick reading of some of these essays provides the best way for you to get a sense of each of the wars. (I say more about case selection in the section on "Selecting a Paper Topic," on p. 11 of this syllabus.) Second, the background reading also allows us to assume, for the purposes of student presentations, that the members of the class have some familiarity with the case, so presenters can focus primarily on their interpretation of the causes of the war rather than on summarizing the history. Third, the background reading will be useful in understanding other students' presentations, asking good questions, and generally participating in the discussions (which is part of your grade).

I will also provide some guidance on the reading for your particular research project. Folders #9-13 include a bibliography for each war, providing a list of sources and suggestions as to some of the most useful sources. You do not need to read all of these sources, and you are encouraged to use additional sources that might be relevant.

## COURSE REQUIREMENTS

There is one interrelated set of formal requirements for the course, centered around your research project on the causes of a particular war and involving three specific tasks:

- 1) a 2-3 page paper (single space) that summarizes alternative interpretations of your historical case and that includes a preliminary bibliography of sources consulted;
- 2) an oral presentation to the class, as part of a panel on your war, summarizing your provisional interpretation of the causes of your war, followed by discussion;
- 3) a 11-15 page (single space) research paper on your war.

The papers should be single space with an extra space between paragraphs. Any citation style is acceptable as long as you are consistent, but include a list of references of sources used at the end of your paper, regardless of citation style. Please use footnotes rather than endnotes. Please include your name and title on the paper, and include page numbers.

There is no mid-term or final examination.

Your final grade for the course will be calculated as follows:

first paper	20%
oral presentation and discussion	20%
research paper	50%
general contributions to class discussion	10%

Note the last item: my judgment of your contribution (quantity and quality) to class discussion, during both our survey of theoretical approaches and in the discussions of presentations of other members of the seminar, will be important in the evaluation of all borderline cases. This gives you a strong incentive to complete all required readings prior to class meetings. Also, I expect you to attend every meeting of the seminar. Grades in borderline cases can be affected by poor attendance. It is particularly inexcusable for students to be absent during other students' presentations.

Students should submit their papers as an attachment under the "Assignments" tab on Sakai. Papers should be in a Word or pdf format. For those who prefer other processing programs, please convert your papers to a Word (.doc or .docx) or PDF format before submitting. Please do not submit your papers in an .odt or other format. Your paper will be automatically be run through the "Turnitin" program, which detect any long passages in a paper that match passages in the "Turnitin" data base, which includes the entire internet.

**Paper #1: Alternative historical interpretations** of your historical case.

2-3 pages, single space, with extra space between paragraphs, including a preliminary bibliography of sources consulted.

Due Thursday, March 2, 11:59pm, at the “Assignments” tab on the course’s Sakai site.

Historians often vary in their interpretations of particular historical events or episodes. Wars are no exception. One thing that motivates professional historians and political scientists is the aim of demonstrating that an existing interpretation is wrong or at least incomplete, suggesting a new interpretation, and support that interpretation with evidence from documents or other sources. If one accepts the conventional wisdom about what happened and why in a particular historical episode, then there is not much point to doing yet another study. This norm is if anything more pronounced in political science. Political scientists who want to test their own theory against the historical evidence identify several alternative theories and then try to demonstrate, based on the evidence, that their preferred theory is superior to the alternatives. By focusing in paper #1 on the alternative historical interpretations of your war, you are situating your paper in the broader literature and setting up your final research paper.

Sometimes it is fairly easy to identify alternative interpretations of a particular war. Take the U.S. decision for war against Iraq in 2003 as an example. Some argue that it was “all about oil.” Others emphasize the ideological aim of overthrowing an evil dictator and bringing democracy to Iraq and to the region; the fear (however misplaced) of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program; the role of neoconservatives in the U.S. decision-making process; or the world view and personality of U.S. President George W. Bush.

Alternative interpretations are sometimes evident in the title of books and articles. The subtitle of Herbert Bass’s book on *American Entry into World War I* (1964), for example, is *Submarines, Sentiment, or Security*. This suggests that American motivations were either the German submarine threat to U.S. commerce or to the principle of freedom of the seas, the ideological commitment to liberal democracies in Europe, or the aim to maintain the balance of power. To take another example, in my study of the Crimean War that I wrote with a student who took this seminar nearly twenty years ago, my coauthor and I used the title “Crisis Mismanagement or Conflict of Interests? A Case Study of the Crimean War.” We framed the study as a debate between the argument that the war was due to the mismanagement of the crisis by political leaders, and the argument that the primary cause of the war was a conflict of vital interests between the two parties.

Identifying alternative interpretations is often complicated by the fact that it is usually possible to identify one or two variations of each alternative interpretation. You have to use your own judgment as to whether a given variation is important enough to qualify as a separate alternative interpretation. The more you read about theories about war and

about historical cases, the better the feel you have for the cases and the easier it is to make these judgments. I am generally looking for three to five alternative interpretations for a particular crisis or war.

If alternative explanations do not “emerge” from debates among historians, you can suggest some yourself based on your understanding of theories of war and peace. One easy approach would be to adopt an approach based on the levels of analysis framework. This might lead to the identification of an international system level (or realist) interpretation, a domestic political interpretation, and an individual level interpretation. Some might want to add a bureaucratic politics interpretation. Others might want to suggest two domestic interpretations – for example, one based on the diversionary theory of war, and another based on the pressure from powerful domestic economic interests.

My primary reason for assigning this first paper is to help you write a better second paper. One thing that separates many excellent research papers from merely good papers (in my classes, at least) is that an excellent paper often includes a discussion of why the student’s interpretation is better than the leading alternative explanations. A condensed and revised version of paper #1 can be incorporated into your final research paper.

This paper need not follow any rigid format. One approach, however, is to include a paragraph for each alternative interpretation, surrounded by an introduction and a conclusion.

### **Paper # 2: Research Paper**

11-15 pages, single space, extra space between paragraphs, footnotes rather than endnotes; include list of references used.

due Friday, May 5, 11:59pm, at the “Assignments” tab on the course Sakai site.

The paper should focus on the causes of the war that you select for investigation. I will provide, in folder #1 on my Sakai site, additional guidelines about the paper, and we will talk more about it on and off throughout the course. In addition, we should have plenty of extra time to talk about the papers at our March 7 class meeting. Let me briefly describe the paper here, however, because it is a major project that requires a major commitment on your part, and you should take this seminar only if the paper is something that you would enjoy doing.

Your basic task in the paper is to select a war from the list of interstate wars provided and to analyze its causes, which involve not only US actions but those of its adversary and perhaps third states. The paper must be more than a historical chronology of the origins of your war. It must provide a theoretically-informed causal interpretation of the outbreak

of the war. That is, you should use some of the theoretical concepts from the first part of the course to help explain the outbreak of your war.

The paper must include an evaluation of the relative importance of different causal factors at different levels of analysis in the processes leading to the outbreak and escalation of the war. I do not want a laundry list of ten or twenty causes of the war. You need to prioritize among the many causes, and identify primary and secondary causes of the war. You also need to support your interpretation with historical evidence. This requires extensive research and extensive footnoting. In your first paper – on alternative interpretations of your war – you should include a list of sources that you have consulted. If something critical is missing I will let you know. If I recommend additional sources that you have omitted, you would be wise to follow up on my suggestions.

To give you a sense of what my expectations are on the papers, and hopefully to reduce the level of uncertainty and anxiety, I have included in folder three of my Sakai site a few sample papers – both alternative interpretations and research papers – from my previous undergraduate research seminars. Those seminars did not have an American focus, so the papers are not on American wars, but the aims of the papers were similar, so they should provide a good sense of my expectations, at least for “A” papers.

### **The Oral Presentation**

You will have 5-6 minutes each for your oral presentations, as part of a group panel on each war. This is not a whole lot of time, and it will go by very quickly. No more than half of your time should be summarizing part of the historical background of the case, and that should be done in coordination with the other students working on that case, so as to minimize overlap. The other half is summarizing your interpretation of the war. Your interpretation is your own, and you do not need to coordinate that with others. In other words, students doing the same case should divide up the history, spending maybe two minutes each, and then each will present their own argument as to the primary and secondary causes of the war. You will have more opportunity to elaborate on your interpretation and on the evidence that supports your view in the lengthy discussion period, in response to questions that arise.

In the question and answer session, other students and I will raise questions relating to the theoretical coherence of your argument, the strength and validity of your supporting evidence, how your interpretation fits with various theories surveyed in the first part of the course, and other topics. Some of these questions will be relevant for your final paper. In fact, you should think of the presentation as a rough draft of your final research paper and as a means of getting feedback to help you improve the paper. With this in mind, I

strongly recommend that after your presentation you take the time to write down all the useful ideas and any responses that come to mind while things are still fresh, so that you can deal with those questions in your final research paper. Or, even better, make a deal with a friend in the course for them to take notes on the questions pertaining to your paper, and you on theirs.

It is worth noting that the more focused and coherent your presentation on the causes of your war, the more useful feedback you will get. This provides an additional incentive to do as much research on your case as possible before your presentation. Know your case.

Among the various theoretical questions we will attempt to answer in our historical cases are the following: What is the relative importance of causal factors from different levels of analysis on each state's behavior? Or, to ask the same question in a slightly different way, what is the relative importance of strategic, ideological, economic, and domestic political motivations in political leaders' decisions on whether or not to escalate a crisis? Do states go to war primarily to increase their power and security, to promote certain principles of justice or forms of socio-political organization, to increase their wealth, or to consolidate the domestic positions of key elites? How important are conflicts of interests over tangible issues, like territorial disputes, as opposed to concerns over power, reputation, and internal politics? Do individual decision-makers make a difference, or would policy choices have been similar if someone else was in power? To what extent are decisions for war made through careful cost-benefit calculations based on state interests and on international and domestic constraints, and to what extent are they driven by flawed information processing and other departures from a rational decision-making calculus?

### **Selecting a Paper Topic**

You should move as quickly as possible to select a war (from the list mentioned above) to serve as the topic of your research paper for the class. The deadline for selecting a topic is the third week of class, January 31. After that, a topic will be assigned to you. Selecting a topic early is important so you can get the topic you want while it is still available. (Though as I said, we can have up to four students on each case.) Selecting a topic early is also important so that you can begin collecting research materials. A fair amount of material will be available on the internet, especially in the form of journal articles, but other material is available only in books. Some books, but perhaps not too many, might be available for free on the internet. Hopefully most other books will be available in Rutgers libraries. If not, you might have to go through EZ Borrow or Interlibrary Loan (if these are unfamiliar, ask the librarian at the Alexander Library Reference Desk for details). These are efficient systems, but they do not work overnight, so please do not put off your collection of research materials until the last minute.

Some of you might already be familiar with some of these cases and know what war you want to study. Most of you are probably less familiar with these cases, so let me suggest a reasonably quick way of gaining enough familiarity with them to help you make an informed decision.

First, I would take a look at the background historical readings (one per case) in folder #2 on Sakai. Next, you could look at a few more articles provided in folders #9-13. You could also look at Wikipedia. Although internet sources like Wikipedia generally focus more on the history of particular wars and what led up to them than on causal explanations for the war, and hence are of limited value for your alternative interpretations paper or your research paper, such sources might be useful for getting a basic sense of the war and helping you decide if you want to research it. However you proceed, one thing to keep in mind is that this class focuses on the causes of the war, not how the war is fought, how it ended, or what its consequences were. Consequently, I suggest that – for the purposes of this class, at least – that you stop reading when the fighting starts.

A final word on case selection is in order. Please do not hesitate to pick one of the early cases just because that would place you in the first or second presentation group. For one thing, my expectations are lower for the early presentations, given both the more restricted time to do your background research and also the lesser familiarity with how things will work. In addition, one advantage to presenting early is that you receive early feedback and have more time to do more research and fine-tune the final research paper before it is due.

**NOTE #1:** Please silence your cell phones before class begins. If you need to have your cell phone on for medical or family reasons, please give me a note from your dean. You are free to use laptop computers, iPADS, or other devices to take notes, to look at the syllabus or reading material online, or to look up other factual material relating to the course, but not for any other purpose – texting or emailing is not permitted.

**NOTE #2: ACADEMIC INTEGRITY.** The University, the Political Science Department, and I each take academic integrity very seriously. The University imposes heavy penalties for plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty. If the meanings of plagiarism or other forms of academic dishonesty are not clear, please see the Rutgers website on academic integrity: <http://academicintegrity.rutgers.edu/> .

**NOTE #3: ABSENCES.** Attendance is required at all sessions.

## COURSE OUTLINE AND READING ASSIGNMENTS

Number indicates the week of the term, beginning January 17; letters represent multiple topics each week. All reading except the Levy & Thompson book is on Sakai

### PART I: THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE

- 1a. **Course Introduction** (January 17)  
focus, aims, organization, requirements  
preliminary discussion of research project
  
- 1b. **What is War? A Clausewitzian Perspective**
  
- 1c. **The Levels of Analysis Framework**  
Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 1  
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- 2. **The System Level: Realist Theories and Theories of Balance of Power and Power Transition** (January 24)  
John Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power"  
Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 2  
Levy, "Preventive War: Concepts and Propositions"  
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- 3. **The Dyadic Level: Strategic Interaction** (January 31)  
Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 3
  
- 3a. **Deterrence and the Spiral Model**  
Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary"
  
- 3b. **Why Can't They Settle? The Bargaining Model of War**  
Blainey, "The Abacus of Power"  
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- 4. **Economic and Societal Theories** (February 7)  
Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 4.  
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- 5a. **The Decision-Making Approach** (February 14)  
Joe Hagan, "Does Decision Making Matter? Systematic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory"
- 5b. **Psychology of Decision-making**  
Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 5  
Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception"  
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6. February 21. No Class. Professor at conference. Work on papers.  
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- 7a. **Politics of Decision-making** (February 28)  
Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 6  
Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics"
- 7b. **Crisis Decision-Making**  
Ole R. Holsti, "Crisis Decision-Making." In Philip E. Tetlock, et al., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.  
Ch. 1.  
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- \*\* Thursday, March 2, Paper #1 due ("Assignments tab" on Sakai, by 11:59pm)  
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- 8a. **Theoretical Summary** (March 7)
- 8b. **Discussion of oral presentation & paper #2**  
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- Spring Break

## PART II: STUDENT PRESENTATIONS

and background reading for each

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| 9.  | March 21 | <p><b>The War of 1812</b><br/>Perkins, “Introduction” to <i>The Causes of the War of 1812</i>.</p> <p><b>Spanish-American War (1898)</b><br/>Jones, “U.S. Imperialism and the New Manifest Destiny, 1897-1900”</p>                                      |
| 10. | March 28 | <p><b>World War I – U.S. Intervention (1917)</b><br/>Bass, “Introduction,” <i>American Entry into World War I</i>, p.1-7.</p>   |
| 11. | April 4  | <p><b>Pacific War (U.S. – Japan, 1941-45)</b><br/>Sagan, “The Origins of the Pacific War”</p>   |
| 12. | April 11 | <p><b>Korean War (1950-53)</b><br/>Stoessinger, “The Temptations of Victory: Korea”</p> <p><b>Vietnam War (1961-1975)</b><br/>Thomson, “How Could Vietnam Happen?”</p>  |
| 13. | April 18 | <p><b>1990/91 Persian Gulf War</b><br/>Freedman &amp; Karsh, “How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War”</p> <p><b>2003 Iraq War</b><br/>Duelfer and Dyson, “Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.-Iraqi Experience.”</p> <hr/> |

## PART III: THEORETICAL COMPARISONS OF HISTORICAL CASES

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| 14. | April 25 |
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### LIST OF DEADLINES

March 2 (midnight)            paper #1

May 5 (midnight),            paper #2

submit each paper to class Sakai site, “Assignments” tab (Word or pdf only)